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Populism as a Concept and the
Challenge of U.S. History
Le concept de populisme et le défi de l’histoire américaine
El populismo como concepto y el desafío de la historia de EE.UU.
Charles Postel
1 In January, 2019, Jair Bolsonaro, was inaugurated as the president of Brazil, the world's
fifth largest country by population. Promising to "rescue the family" and "our Judeo-
Christian tradition," Bolsonaro has built  a reputation for his vitriol  against women,
homosexuals,  indigenous  people,  Afro-Brazilians,  and  a  variety  of  "traitors"  to  the
country. His motto is "Brazil above everything, God above all." With Bolsonaro's rise to
power,  Brazil  has  joined  an  expanding  list  of  governments  that  have  a  common
approach to politics. They each have their specific histories and trajectories, and some
of them share more than others do; but they have built their political power by various
combinations  of  ethno-cultural  division,  racial  and  gender  bigotry,  and  political
intolerance. Among such governments stand the administrations of Narendra Modi's
Bharatiya Janata Party in India and Donald Trump's Republican Party in the United
States, the second and third largest countries in the world respectively. Add to this list
Poland,  Israel,  Hungary,  Italy,  the  Philippines,  Turkey,  and  elsewhere  –  along  with
kindred political parties across Europe and beyond - and it suggests that Bolsonaro's
rise is part of a menacing global phenomenon (Anderson P., 2019; Anderson J.L., 2009).
2 This poses a series of questions about how this menace is to be understood in terms of
historical  roots,  underlying forces,  and prospects.  The most basic question is:  What
type of  political  animal is  afoot ?  And the most common answer is  that Bolsonaro,
Trump, and the rest, can best be understood as part of a global rise of populism. In one
way or another, journalists and pundits, along with a considerable cadre of political
scientists  and  other  academics,  tell  us  that  the  concept  of  populism  is  the  key  to
understanding the forces of intolerance and bigotry that have been unleashed on the
political  landscape.  In  recent  years,  this  claim has  been made in  bold  headlines  in
newspapers and magazines of  all  types,  and in confident titles  of  books,  as  well  as
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academic  journals  and  symposia.  But  the  more  claims,  the  more  books,  the  more
studies the weaker the case becomes.
3 The weakness is reflected in the agony of definitions. In recent years, the most diligent
efforts  to  construct  workable  frameworks  for  the  meaning  of  populism  have  only
shown  how  wobbly  and  unworkable  the  frameworks  tend  to  be.  It  is  partly  the
conflicting nature of the definitions. It is partly their ahistorical character. Political
experience in the United States, as this paper explores, challenges the way that the
term is being used and abused. The challenge extends to the histories of Europe, Latin
America,  and  beyond.  As  an  analytical  concept  for  making  sense  of  the  present
historical moment, populism is an analytical popgun.
 
The Definition Conundrum
4 There are nearly as many formulas for defining the concept of populism as there are
books, papers, and treatises on the topic. The formulas, however, tend to fall within, or
at least near, three interpretive models. The first might be called the European model,
because  it  derives  mainly  from the European context  and that  is  where  it  is  often
applied. This is also the simplest and most direct of the definitions: populism is the
nationalist politics of hate. This is a definition provided, for example by John Lukacs,
who, from his vantage point as a historian of the European carnage of the 1930s and
1940s, used the term broadly. Lukacs experienced the nationalist hatreds of war close
at hand in his native Budapest before departing Hungary for the United States in 1946,
where he began a long career writing about the European catastrophe. Lukacs wrote of
the dangers in the "popular sentiments" unleashed by democracy, sentiments that led
to national  hatred – that  is  to  say populism – and which were widespread "almost
everywhere" during the long twentieth century. Hitler "was a populist," he argued, as
was Emiliano Zapata and other figures of the Mexican Revolution, and so too were the
U.S. Populists of the 1890s - what he described as "American national socialists of a
kind." It is unclear how influential Lukac's ideas have been, but the basic structure of
his claim of populism-as-nationalism is at least widely reflected in the commentary of
journalists and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic. The designator populism serves as
shorthand  for  nationalistic  passions,  anti-Semitism,  xenophobia,  and  racial  and
religious  bigotry,  and  often  also  carries  the  connotation  of  demagogy,
authoritarianism, and political intolerance. In this usage, it is unnecessary to mention
the family resemblance with the nationalist hatreds unleashed in the inter-war years
that produced National Socialism, the Holocaust, and global war. Yet, as in Lukacs's
jeremiads, it is the unspoken assumption in the editorials and commentaries about the
populist danger (Lukacs, J., 2005: 19, 21, 61; Lukacs, J., 2013: 4-5, 70; Baumgärtner, M., et
al., 2019; Mounk, Y., 2014; Galston, W., 2018: 33-40). 
5 Then  there  is  the  Latin  American  model,  whereby  populism  has  represented  an
inclusive alternative to exclusive structures of power. In the name of the people, under
conditions  when  formal  liberal  democracy  has  represented  the  narrow  politics  of
oligarchs, populism has expanded political space to include workers, the poor, and the
marginalized. In places, populism has also involved a more racially inclusive politics,
especially  regarding  the  indigenous  and  black  communities  of  the  Andes,  the
Caribbean, and elsewhere. Another feature of the Latin American formula has been the
key role played by the charismatic leader. From Juan Perón of Argentina and Getúlio
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Vargas of Brazil in the mid-twentieth century, to Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo
Morales  of  Bolivia  in  the  early  twenty-first  century,  populism  has  represented  a
personalized politics  that  has  tended towards a  type of  authoritarian rule  that  has
recurred on the Latin American scene (Halperin, D., 1993: 258-66). This type of politics
might  also  be  described  as  Peronism,  after  its  best-known  practitioner.  For  the
Argentine  social  theorist  Ernesto  Laclau,  populism  carried  the  promise  of  radical
democracy, a path towards the "widening horizons" of social mobilization and political
transformation (Laclau, E., 2005: 250). Federico Finchelstein offers a variation on the
theme, insisting that populism is neither fascism nor an egalitarian form of democracy,
but an authoritarian form of democracy that rose from the wreckage of fascism in post-
war Argentina. As such, populism has played its democratic role. But with its reliance
on  a  messianic  leader  and  its  repressive  tendencies  it  also  poses  a  global  danger.
Populism, "born at the Latin American margins," Finchelstein warns, has "moved to
Washington,  DC,"  and  is  "now  threatening  the  future  of  our  democratic  times"
(Finchelstein, F., 2017: XIII-XVI, 150, 254-56). 
6 This brings us to the third and most perplexing of the models, that is the American
model  in  which  populism  reveals  itself  as  a  shape-shifting  phantom.  In  its  classic
iteration, this takes the form of a narrative about the People's Party (or Populist Party)
of the 1890s, which originally pursued progressive and leftwing politics, but which in
the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century  reemerged  as  rightwing  bigotry  and
intolerance. This is the narrative associated with the historian Richard Hofstadter and
an  influential  group  of  mid-twentieth  century  social  scientists  concerned  with  the
social  psychology  of  mass  movements.  In  the  work  of  Hofstadter  and  like-minded
intellectuals,  the  anxieties,  misplaced  fears,  and  irrational  delusions  of  the  late
nineteenth century Populist farmers served as the fountainhead of America's politics of
unreason,  demagogy,  authoritarianism,  xenophobia,  anti-Semitism,  and  narrow-
mindedness. In his 1955 work The Age of Reform, Hofstadter performed a remarkable act
of alchemy by finding a way to transform the leftwing Populism of the 1890s into the
"illiberal and ill-tempered" and "cranky-pseudo-conservatism" of 1950s McCarthyism.
He claimed that the one "soured" into the other (Hofstadter, R., 1955: 20; Ferkiss, V.
1957: 350-57; Lipset and Raab, 1978: 90-4). 
7 This  claim  continues  to  have  wide  influence  among  journalists,  pundits,  and  even
within some of the social sciences. It has been absorbed into the European and Latin
American interpretive models. Lukacs, for example, cited Hofstadter to describe Joseph
McCarthy as "the quintessential populist." Similarly, Finchelstein maps the Hofstadter
claim  onto  his  own  historical  narrative  (Lukacs,  J.,  2005:  51;  Finchelstein,  F.,  2017:
155-56). The historian Alan Brinkley described The Age of Reform as "the most influential
book ever published on the history of twentieth-century America" (Brinkley A., 1985).
But this says more about the class prejudices of Hofstadter's readers, and their notions
of the psychological afflictions of working people, than it does about the veracity of
Hofstadter's  thesis,  which  from  the  time  of  publication  has  been  thoroughly
dismantled. Walter Nugent, Norman Pollack, Michael Rogin, C. Vann Woodward, among
many other scholars in the 1950s and 1960s,  demonstrated that Hofstadter's  claims
about the Populist roots of McCarthyism were ahistorical, exaggerated, and otherwise
unfounded (Woodward, C.V., 1960; Nugent, W., 1963; Pollack, N., 1962; Rogin, M., 1967;
Postel, C., 2016a: 116-35). 
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8 Yet, Hofstadter's shape-shifting phantom continues to prowl. In part, this is due to the
efforts to keep the kernel of Hofstadter's argument, while discarding what is clearly not
verifiable in the historical  record.  Thus,  for example,  in his  1995 book,  The Populist
Persuasion, Michael Kazin accepts that in terms of ideology or politics there was no
direct  link  between  Populism  of  the  1890s  and  McCarthyism  of  the  1950s.  Rather,
Populism and McCarthyism shared a common "mode of persuasion," a language or style
that Kazin claims offered both hope and menace across two centuries of U.S. history. He
defined populism as "a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble
assemblage,"  and  who  seek  to  mobilize  the  people  against  their  "elite  opponents"
(Kazin, M., 1995). Leaning on Kazin, the journalist John Judis, in his recent offering The
Populist Explosion, has given this language uncanny global power. Populism, he claims,
"is  an  American  creation  that  spread  later  to  Latin  America  and  Europe."  More
specifically, according to Judis, populism is an invention of the leftwing People's Party
of the 1890s, that not only gave life to the American rightwing after WWII, it was also
"transported" to Europe in the 1970s where it took the form of Jean-Marie Le Pen's
French National Front and other rightwing movements (Judis, J., 2016: 14-19, 88-89).
9 These three continental models, providing three different historical narratives, are to a
considerable degree incompatible, even in their most generalized form. However, to
move from the general to the specific makes the problem of definitions that much more
acute. In the Latin American case, for example, the charismatic or messianic leader is
the norm; in the case of the People's Party and a number of other supposedly populist
movements in the United States, there was no such leader. Rural militias dedicated to
fighting federal central authority are claimed to be symptomatic of U.S. populism; Latin
American populisms, as Laclau reminded us, were urban based and "essentially state
populisms,  trying  to  reinforce  the  role  of  the  central  state  against  landowning
oligarchies" (Crothers, L., 2018: 3-13; Laclau, E., 2005: 192). The list of such fundamental
differences in characteristics is a long one, and causes a series of obstacles to those who
continue  to  insist  that  populism  represents  a  useful  general  category  of  analysis.
Accordingly,  the  number  of  characteristics  that  supposedly  define  populism  keeps
growing  shorter,  more  indefinite,  and  more  tentative.  And,  as  it  turns  out,  the
contradictions  of  definition  have  so  far  at  least  proven  insurmountable  without  a
strong dose of the alchemy provided by the American model. 
 
Populism as Americanism
10 In  this  regard  the  Dutch  political  scientist  Cas  Mudde  and  his  Chilean  colleague
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser have provided a service with their publication of Populism:
A Very Short Introduction. The authors are steeped in expertise in European and Latin
American politics, and their concise book provides a synthetic explication of the idea of
populism as  a  global  concept.  They  finesse  the  contradictions  in  such  a  way  as  to
provide a universal definition that is presumably sufficiently flexible to stretch across
the  continents  to  cover  a  multiplicity  of  political  phenomena.  Mudde  and  Rovira
Kaltwasser  preface  their  definition  with  the  claim  that  populism  is  not  merely  a
language or style, but an ideology. But that comes with a key qualifier: populism is
what they call a "thin-centered ideology," that is to say it is insufficiently robust to
stand on its own, and therefore attaches to "thick-centered" or "full" ideologies (for
examples  of  the  latter  they  list  fascism,  liberalism,  and  socialism).  This  poses  the
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immediate question: why then does populism have particular significance as a concept
given that it is such a "thin" ideology with such a "restricted morphology"? (Mudde, C.,
2007:  23;  Mudde,  C.  & Rovira Kaltwasser,  C.,  2017:  1-6).  Or why so many books and
theses and symposia about so-called populism, when it is at most a vaguely defined
appendage to "full" ideologies such as conservatism and rightwing nationalism? Or why
is it then so important to add the designator "left-populism" to the Spanish Podemos or
the Greek Syriza, movements that would be better understood as left-social democratic
or  a  similar  "full"  ideological  designation?  The  concept  of  populism  as  a  "thin"
ideology, however, serves the authors well, because it allows them to accept that the
attenuated nature of populism means that it can only explain so much. Nonetheless, at
a certain point thin becomes threadbare (Mudde, C., 2016).
11 Reducing its characteristics to its essential minimum, Mudde writes that populists view
society as divided "into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people'
versus 'the corrupt elite.'" And in line with this division, he claims that populists also
hold that "politics should be an expression of the volanté générale (general will) of the
people" (Mudde, C., 2007: 23). That populism involves a contrast between a virtuous
and victimized people and a corrupt or malign elite, may seem plausible, but dig a little
deeper, and it poses more problems than it answers. Among such problems, there are
plenty of rightwing nationalists on the political stage who do not pay much attention to
this division. Take Jair Bolsonaro, for example, a former military captain who built his
career as a legislator with military votes, and who finds political virtue mainly with the
torturers and authoritarians of the Brazilian officer corps (Anderson P., 2019; Anderson
J. L., 2019). It is difficult to detect what is "populist" about the Bolsonaro administration
with its "motley cabinet, made up of climate change deniers, free-market ideologues,
and ultra-right conspiracy theorists" (Baiocchi,  G.,  & Silva,  M.,  2019).  Then there is
Donald Trump, who rarely speaks about "the people," and endlessly boasts of his place
among the global  plutocrats,  monarchs,  dictators,  billionaires,  and other  elites.  Cas
Mudde has  recognized this  about  Trump,  and has  suggested that  he  may not  be  a
populist at all, but that only his political base is populist (Mudde, C., 2015). There is,
however, a better explanation. Trump has built his political career on crude appeals to
nationalist sentiment, both in the sense of big-power chauvinism and especially ethno-
cultural  bigotry.  Trump takes  this  as  a  point  of  pride.  "You know what  I  am?"  he
recently asked the crowd at a rally in Texas, "I'm a nationalist, O.K.? Nationalist. Use
that word, use that word" (Sonmez, F., 2018; Baker, P., 2018). Indeed, when it comes to
"thick ideology," nationalism fits, not only Trump, but also his base supporters in their
Make  America  Great  Again  caps.  And  this  is  not  any  type  of  nationalism,  but  a
rightwing nationalism of ethno-cultural division and exclusion and the subjugation of
the weak by the strong. 
12 There is, however, a more generalized problem here: virtually all politics in the United
States, at least since the early days of universal white male suffrage, have been rooted
in the assumption that the will of the people is measured by the results of elections,
and those elections have inevitably revolved around the narrative of the people taking
on the elites at the ballot box. For the last two hundred years, the stage of American
politics has been crowded with military generals and wealthy slave holders, corporate
lawyers and millionaires,  with a few academics and a large number of  professional
politicians  –  all playing the  part  of  the  representatives  of  the  plain  people,  or  the
common man, or the middle class, or the silent majority, in their struggle against the
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elites in Washington. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser recognize this reality and explain
that: "The idea that the people are virtuous and the elite corrupt has been propagated
in both high and low culture throughout the history of the United States," and they
conclude that populism has been part of the American political "mainstream" since the
days of Thomas Paine. They suggest that this is different from Europe with its tradition
of  suffrage  restrictions  and  where  elite  politics  have  had  greater  prominence.  For
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser then, American political history is essentially populist
history. It is the notion of populism as American political language or style repackaged
as a global "thin" ideology. (Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C., 2017: 106-08). 
13 America, of course, has never been separate from the world. Here it might be noted
that  there  was  a  reason  why  Thomas  Paine  departed  the  United  States  for
revolutionary  Paris.  Moreover,  nineteenth  century  France  also  experienced  its
moments  when  "the  people"  confronted  various  elites  on  the  political  stage.  The
Revolution of 1848 was such a moment. In Marx's account of events, the democrats,
based on the newly expanded suffrage, claimed to "constitute the 'PEOPLE,'" and to
represent  the  "people's  rights,"  and  the  "people's  interests"  against  their  elite
"oppressors." And Louis Napoleon also pointed to ballot results to claim himself, "as
against  the  bourgeoisie,"  the  representative  of  "the  farmer  and people  in  general"
(Marx K., 1913: 16, 57, 131, 155). Indeed, in modern political history, juxtapositions of
the people and the elite have complex roots in the dynamics of political legitimacy and
representative  governance.  Perhaps  then,  populism  is  just  another  way  to  define
popular politics under the conditions of broad suffrage. But that is clearly not what
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser have in mind, because populism in their descriptions has
a  distinctly  menacing aspect,  the  whiff  of  dangerous,  anti-pluralist,  intolerant,  and
authoritarian politics. And, their first proof lies in the lessons of U.S. populism, from
the People's Party of the 1890s, through the fires of McCarthyism, to the depredations
of the Trump White House (Mudde C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C., 2017: 22-27). 
 
The Achilles Heel
14 But  this  American  lesson  only  works  if  one  ignores  the  overwhelming  historical
evidence. More precisely, it is based on ignoring a vast body of scholarship about the
actual history of Populism in the United States. Over the last half-century and more
since  the  publication  of  The  Age  of  Reform, scholars  have  published  an  extensive
catalogue  of  monographs  and  articles  based  on  deep  archival  research  on  U.S.
Populism. This is a rich historiography, reflecting widely different methods, interests,
and interpretations. Lawrence Goodwyn and Bruce Palmer saw the Populists though
the lens of the New Left. Sheldon Hackney, Elizabeth Sanders, Charles Postel, and Gregg
Cantrell  have placed the Populists  in  the broad left  current  of  a  social  democratic,
progressive, or modern liberal (in the American sense) tradition. Robert McMath, Jr.
and Steven Hahn focus on the rural roots of Populism, while the work of Thomas Clinch
and Michael Pierce point to its urban and labor foundations. Studies by Barton Shaw
and Gerald Gaither give less credence to the racial benevolence of the Populists than
other studies have, whereas Omar Ali points to the presence of an African American
populism. Essentially none of this archival research has sustained the Hofstadter thesis.
Quite the contrary, it has left it in ruins. Yet, essentially none of it has informed the
work of Mudde and the other theorists of global populism (Goodwyn, L., 1976; Palmer,
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B., 1980; Hackney, S., 1969; Sanders, E., 1999; Postel, C., 2007; Cantrell, G., 2014; McMath,
R., 1975, 1993; Hahn, S., 1985; Clinch, T., 1970; Pierce, M., 2010; Shaw, B., 1984; Gaither,
G., 1977; Ali, O., 2010).1
15 A  very  different  U.S.  Populism  comes  into  view  if  one  takes  this  scholarship  into
account. The literature on the American movement is too extensive to properly review
in this short essay, but the basic facts are clear enough. Populism was mainly a farmer-
labor movement whose roots took hold in the egalitarian zeitgeist of the post-Civil War
decades.  Unlike  a  traditional  political  party,  the  People's  Party  was  formed  as  a
"congress of industrial  organizations" that brought under one political roof farmer,
labor,  women's  rights,  and  associated  movements  ideologically  connected  by  their
demands for economic, sexual, and in some cases racial equality. As Noberto Bobbio
reminded us, the "element of egalitarianism" typifies what is "called and universally
recognized as left-wing.” U.S.  Populism, however,  was not just any type of leftwing
movement, as its egalitarian ideology took shape in a specific time and global context.
It  was  part  of  the  politics  of  "progressive  social  and  economic  equalization"  that
defined the broad current of late-nineteenth century transatlantic social democracy. In
other  words,  in  terms of  general  categories,  U.S.  Populism was  a  social-democratic
movement and not a populist one. As Federico Finchelstein points out, "pundits often
ahistorically  confuse  social  democracy,  progressive  politics,  and  populism."  U.S.
Populism has  been the  subject  of  exactly  that  type  of  ahistorical  confusion,  whose
depths are reflected in the following three observations (Postel, C., 2019: 3-10, 305-08;
Bobbio, N., 1996: 71; Kloppenberg, J., 1986: 6-7, 184; Finchelstein F., 2017: vx).
16 First,  the People's Party had no particular commitment to the idea of "the people,"
much less "the homogenous people." Rather, the party was founded on explicit interest
group politics;  it  was  to  be  a  combination  of  multiple  "class  interests,"  not  in  the
Marxist or Weberian sociological sense, but in the sense of commercial or occupational
or professional interests. Charles Macune, the leading theorist of the Farmers' Alliance,
the largest  of  the Populist  constituencies,  explicitly  rejected agrarianism and other
precepts that  failed to recognize agriculture as  a  business interest  like every other
(Dunning, N., 1891). The Minnesota Populist Ignatius Donnelly, often spoke of society
(or the people) being comprised of multiple interests or classes and, as he told a group
of Minnesota farmers, by securing "justice from other classes," the goal was "not to
oppress  others  but  to  prevent  others  from  oppressing  you"  (Donnelly,  I.,  1873).
Similarly, Terence Powderly, the leader of the Knights of Labor, a massive organization
of wage earners, called himself "an equalizer," because he believed in equality among
workers across skill, sex, and (within limits) nationality and race, and equality for wage
earners among other occupations and professions (Powderly T., 1940: 36, 48-51). But as
a labor leader, Powderly did not theorize about "the people" as such, any more than the
farm leaders did. It would be a mistake, therefore, to read too much into the name
"People's Party," because in the nineteenth century this was simply a common party
name  when  "Democratic"  or  "Republican"  were  already  taken.  Also,  the  famous
Preamble of the Populists' "Omaha Platform," refers to the "plain people," and repeats
the word people several times in the manner that was nearly universally practiced in
nineteenth century politics (People’s Party, 1892). Here it should be noted that Ignatius
Donnelly was the author of that Preamble, and although he was a mercurial figure of
iconoclastic opinions, his opinions were complex when it came to society's divergent
interests. Moreover, the Preamble introduced the Populists' platform, which reflected
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not the unitary interests  of  a  "homogenous people" but a mix of  labor and farmer
demands – from the eight-hour day to the progressive income tax – that would have
been typical of a farmer-labor coalition of that era. And there was nothing simplistic
about Populist proposed solutions. Compared to the moralistic dogma of “Gold Bug”
and corporate conservatives, Populist ideas about the currency, farm credit, business
regulation, and other matters were flexible, complex, and carefully reasoned, and more
often than not they have been sustained by history. 
17 Second,  far  from  being  "anti-pluralists,"  most  Populists  were  committed  to  a
representative electoral system. This was tested in practice when the People's Party
held state and city office. In power, as compared to the political abuses involved in
either Democratic or Republican governance, Populists tended to provide models of
transparent, law based, and equitable administration. Among other accomplishments,
they worked to professionalize law enforcement and break the grip of party rings over
policing. They protected the franchise among African Americans and the poor in North
Carolina, and extended the suffrage to women in Colorado and elsewhere (Beckel, D.,
2010; Clanton, O., 1969; Larson, R., 1986). At the same time, Populists demanded the
secret  ballot  at  a  time when employers  and party bosses  openly bought votes,  and
blacklisted voters who cast ballots for dissenting candidates. They also demanded the
direct election of U.S. senators at a time when senate seats were purchased through
bribes to state legislators, and similarly they proposed direct legislation via referenda
as an answer to corporate influence buying. Direct legislation implied an element of
majoritarianism, but gained support among workers and farmers within the historical
context of the extraordinary corruption of Gilded Age politics. 
18 Apart from practical politics, however, panaceas and utopias also circulated within the
Populist movement. Perhaps the most influential was Henry George's single tax on land
values, a solution to economic inequality that was widely embraced among Populist
constituencies.  George  viewed his  single  tax  as  a  way  to  realize  the  "ideals  of  the
socialist" but without confiscations or political repression. In fact, it was something of a
classically liberal idea along the lines of the wealth taxes proposed today by the likes of
Tomas Piketty or Elizabeth Warren (George, H., 1881: 410; Piketty, T., 2014: 515-539;
Irwin,  N.,  2019).  Perhaps  less  liberal,  and  less  pluralist,  Populist  thinking  was  also
influenced by notions of  a  cooperative commonwealth as  articulated by two books:
Laurence Grondlund's Cooperative Commonwealth and Edward Bellamy's futuristic novel
Looking  Backward.  Both  works  painted  an  egalitarian  future  without  politics  or
government, a harmonious future to be realized through harmonious evolution. Their 
socialism was part of the transatlantic intellectual movement of Fabian, humanist, and
Christian socialisms – that is to say socialism stripped of the dyadic conflict – of the “us
against them” – that is supposedly resting in the heart of the so-called populist menace
(Gronlund, L., 1885; Bellamy, E., 1888; Postel, C., 2019: 279-95).
19 Third, Hofstadter's claims about the Populists as the fountainhead of American bigotry,
xenophobia,  and anti-Semitism have been refuted in depth in the scholarship.2 But
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser have adopted a twist on the same argument. American
Populists, they claim, have always been informed by "producerism," the notion of the
people as "producers" who are "squeezed between a corrupt elite above them and a
racialized underclass below them" (Mudde C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C., 2017: 23-4). This
claim  about  the  Populists  is  also  made  by  the  analyst  Chip  Berlet,  who  defines
producerism as the idea that hardworking Americans, defined as white males, engage
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in scapegoating as they fight perceived "parasites at the top and bottom of society"
(Berlet,  C.,  2012:  47-66).  Indeed,  that  is  a  good  description  of  the  late  nineteenth
century logic of white supremacy in the Democratic Party and ethno-cultural bigotry in
the  Republican  Party,  a  logic  that  also  afflicted  the  trade  unions,  and  professional
societies of the time. The Populists did, indeed, speak in the name of producers, but
what  makes  the  Populists  historically  significant  was  the  extent  to  which  their
egalitarian commitments ruptured this exclusive logic.  This included organizing the
“tramp armies” of the unemployed and destitute, and providing a political home for
hundreds  of  thousands  of  women  seeking  economic  independence  and  equal
citizenship. Its declarations about racial inclusion were less bold, and were too often
self-contradictory.  Nonetheless,  key  Populist  constituencies  openly  challenged  a
narrow producerism as so defined. 
20 This especially holds for the Knights of Labor, which rejected trade unionism based on
the "aristocrats of labor," in favor of “industrial organization” based on "the salt of the
earth,"  that  is  "the  millions  of  unknown  toilers  who  do  the  work  of  the  world"
(Powderly,  T.,  1940:  42;  Powderly,  T.,  1880;  Knights of  Labor,  1886).  At its  core,  the
Knights was an organization of the Irish and other mainly immigrant laborers who
mined coal and laid railway tracks. But in line with its egalitarian doctrine of inclusion
across  sex,  race,  and  skill,  it  also  enrolled  cooks,  washerwomen,  housekeepers,
seamstresses, ditch diggers, and cotton pickers, including overworked and underpaid
black women and men of the rural South. At its height the Knights of Labor was not
only the biggest labor organization in U.S. history (and probably world history) to that
point, it was also the most inclusive large-scale institution of its era. Recognizing this
inclusiveness,  Friedrich Engels  described the Knights of  Labor as "the first  national
organization  created  by  the  American  working  class  as  a  whole"  (Engels,  F.,  1987:
130-40, 140). 
21 There was, however, a gaping hole in the Knights' egalitarian ethos, and that was its
hostility to Chinese immigration. Although Chinese workers joined the Knights in New
York, on the West Coast the organization fought hard for Chinese exclusion. The false
accusation leveled against the Chinese was that they were, like convict labor, unfree
"bound" labor. But two things happened when the Knights of Labor united with the
Farmers' Alliance to form the People's Party. On the one hand, unity with the white
farmers fractured the Knights' connection with the black poor in the South. And on the
other hand, influenced by white farmers in California who depended on Chinese labor,
as well as other reformers interested in Asia for humanitarian and spiritual reasons,
the forging of the People's Party dampened the agitation for Chinese exclusion. In a
word, this story is complicated, but the decontextualized notion of producerism tells us
little about its dynamics (Postel, C., 2019: 231-37, 302-05; Postel, C., 2007: 185-86, 264).
 
The U.S. Populist Legacy
22 In one of its last acts, the Knights of Labor facilitated an electoral agreement between
the white Populists and the black Republicans of North Carolina, overturning at the
ballot box the corrupt, pro-corporate, and racist tyranny of the Democratic Party. But
the  Democrats  got  their  revenge in  a  self-styled "white  supremacy campaign"  that
unleashed the Wilmington massacre of 1898, and drove the Populist-Republicans from
office with rifles and torches. From that time until  the 1960s, the Democratic Party
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established an anti-pluralist, murderously repressive monopoly of power in the states
of the former Confederacy, and it did so as the self-described party of white supremacy.
George Wallace, the segregationist governor of Alabama, was entirely the product of
that Democratic Party. Yet, for Mudde, Judis, and others, George Wallace represents
late twentieth-century U.S. populism (Mudde C. & C. Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017: 25; Judis
J., 2016: 32-8). But Wallace, in style and substance, was cut from the same mold as the
Democrats who launched the "white supremacy campaign" against the North Carolina
Populists. Blaming the Populists and not their Democratic enemies for Wallace is an
ahistorical  travesty.  Similarly,  Republican businessmen and academics,  not  Populist
dirt  farmers,  spearheaded  xenophobic  campaigns  against  Jewish,  Italian,  and  other
European immigrants.  Madison Grant,  a  New York Republican millionaire,  scientific
racist and virulent anti-Semite, did as much as anyone to put the politics of preserving
the “Nordic master race” in the center of American politics. And the notion that the
Populist legacy gave the world Trump, another racist Republican millionaire from New
York, is beyond inexplicable (Spiro, J., 2009).
23 It is inexplicable because the Populists actually left a clearly distinguishable legacy in
American politics. With the demise of the People's Party, with a few notable exceptions,
the Populists either went with Eugene V. Debs into the Socialist Party, or entered the
progressive or farmer-labor wings of the Democratic and Republican Parties.  In the
early twentieth century, the Populist strongholds of Oklahoma and Kansas provided the
Socialist Party with some of its best recruiting grounds. Progressive legislative reform
of the early twentieth century mapped closely along the congressional lines of farmer-
labor Populism. Lyndon Johnson, the New Deal liberal who signed the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and thus earned the hatred of Wallace and his ilk, learned his politics at the knee of
his  grandfather,  a  Populist  cotton  farmer  from  central  Texas.  Perhaps  most
significantly, during the Depression, the United Mine Workers, the inheritors of the
Knights  of  Labor's  ideals  of  egalitarian  and  inclusive  organizing,  unleashed  the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, the labor movement that helped spark the civil
rights revolution and that was at the center of mid-twentieth century progressive and
social-democratic  politics.  This  Populist  legacy  is  reflected  in  today's  campaigns  of
Bernie  Sanders  and Elizabeth Warren,  with  Sanders  hanging a  picture  of  the  labor
Populist and Socialist Eugene V. Debs on his office wall, and with Warren proposing
post-office banking and similar proposals once sustained by the Populists and Socialists
of  her native Oklahoma. In short,  the Populist  tradition is  part  of  a  broad political
current as stable, deep, and constant as any other political current in American history
(Miller, R., 1987; Argersinger, P., 1995: 173; McMath, R., 1993: 206; Sanders, E.,  1999;
Cantrell, G., 2014; Kelley, R., 1990: 138-51). 
24 The existing general theories about a global populism turn this egalitarian or social-
democratic tradition into an unusable past.  This is  especially a problem in the U.S.
context,  where  the  conflicted,  arbitrary,  and ahistorical  uses  of  the  term populism
threaten  to  strip  it  of  any  viable  meaning  (Postel,  C.,  2016b).  But  it  is  not  just  an
American problem, because the U.S.  example of populism supposedly shape-shifting
from left  to  right  is  being used as  the case study for  a  general  concept,  a  concept
fraught with contradictions and ahistorical  thinking.  Worse,  its  main function is  to
muddy the distinction between leftwing politics of equality and rightwing politics of
inequality, and it does so exactly at a wrong historical moment. Norberto Bobbio's work
Right and Left insisted on the importance of making the distinction between the two
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political categories.  However, as Perry Anderson observed, Bobbio wrote this in the
mid-1990s, a historical moment when the practical distinction between the right and
the  left  shrank,  with  the  left,  in  the  form  of  British  New  Labor,  Clintonian  New
Democrats in the United States, and Social Democrats across Europe, moving to the
center to join hands with the centrist conservative parties. Anderson suggested that
Bobbio  was  insisting  on  a  distinction  that  was  increasingly  blurred,  as  even  the
vocabulary of right and left was losing its meaning in the swamps of the centrist middle
(Anderson,  P.,  2005:  129-39).  But  the  apparent  centrist  consensus  has  frayed.  Most
importantly, rightwing nationalist parties, including ruling parties in countries around
the world, are engaged in what they see as a pitiless struggle against the so-called left,
or a supposed "cultural Marxism," or other enemies of the nation. Bolsonaro is not
Modi, and Trump is not Orbán, but in the name of the nation, religion, the family, and
order – the classic shibboleths of the nationalist right over the last two centuries – they
share  a  common  commitment  to  the  class,  gender,  and  racial/ethno-cultural
hierarchies of power. 
25 The  break  with  the  centrist  consensus,  at  least  up  until  now,  has  been  an
overwhelmingly rightwing nationalist phenomenon. There has been no corresponding
shift on the left as, for example, much of the U.S. Democratic Party and European Social
Democracy (where it has not disintegrated) remain in the centrist middle. But there are
small signs – Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, a faction of Labor in Britain, and so
forth  –  of  a  reinvigorated  social-democratic  left.  In  the  United  States,  too,  this  is
reflected in the Sanders and Warren campaigns. In his attempts to define the populist
concept,  the  political  scientist  Jan-Werner  Müller  makes  a  significant  point  of
clarification by explicitly excluding leftwing social democratic movements, including
the U.S. People's Party of the 1890s, from the populist category (Müller, J.-W., 2016:
87-93, 98). But in the main, the advocates of populism as a general concept insist that
leftwing  movements  that  critique  the  centrist  middle  are  a  contiguous  part  of  the
populist phenomenon. For some commentators, the use of the concept in this way is
pregnant with possibilities. John Judis, for example, who writes about the "merit" of
"Mr.  Trump's  nationalist  policies,"  explains  that  when  it  comes  to  the  blight  of
immigration  and  similar  matters,  if  the  left  could  accept  "what  is  valid  in  today's
nationalist  backlash," then it,  too,  could surf the populist  wave (Judis,  J.,  2016:  159;
Judis, J., 2018). But this is more than an apologia for xenophobia and nationalism; it is a
failure to recognize the dynamics of the rightwing surge. However, for Mudde and like-
minded theorists, the use of the concept of populism serves as a warning: the so-called
"left-populists" share a "dark side" with the "right-populists." The populist beast that
inhabits territory outside of the centrist middle belongs to an unstable and potentially
dangerous category. As Hofstadter suggested back in the frightening days of the early
Cold War: beware departures from the centrist consensus. 
 
A Modest Proposal
26 There is no easy way out of the confusion, but a modest step towards some type of
clarity would be to ground the concept of populism on a firm historical foundation.
Exactly where that will  end is yet to be determined, but perhaps it will  lead in the
following direction: 
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27 The present usages of the term populism cannot be packaged into a coherent whole.
Among  other  things,  the  continental  models  are  inherently  contradictory  and
incompatible. It is a mere word game, not a historically based analysis, to suggest that
the phrase populism can overcome those contradictions. In Latin America, for example,
populism is  understandably bound up with a  history of  a  type of  personalistic  and
nationalist politics that has often combined charismatic leadership with an expanded
polity in terms of class and race. In the United States, by contrast, populism has deep
historic roots in labor-farmer social reform. Of course, these historical processes were
not hermetically sealed. For example, a case might be made that in the 1930s Huey
Long,  whose  redistributive  politics  reflected  the  earlier  Populism,  emerged  as  the
political boss of Louisiana with its sugar and oil extractive economy, and in doing so
resembled  a  Caribbean  strongman  –  a  historically  and  geographically  grounded
argument (Lloret Rodà, M., 2016). Given such variable and incompatible meanings, the
use  of  populism as  a  concept  may prove  most  promising  within  the  boundaries  of
particular histories and places. 
28 At  the  same  time,  history  has  left  us  with  nearly  universal  concepts  that  do  lend
themselves  to  transnational  analysis.  Social  democracy  is  such  a  concept.  Ethno-
cultural nationalism is such a concept, as is xenophobia, racism, religious bigotry, and
other  variants.  Then  there  are  the  concepts  of  the  left  and  the  right  that  have
maintained  their  significance  since  the  days  of  the  French  Revolution.  These  are
concepts based on different perceptions of “what makes human beings equal and what
makes  them  unequal,"  and  which  ultimately  shape  societies  in  fundamental  ways
(Bobbio, N., 1996). In the 1950s, U.S. Cold War social scientists cooked up the ahistorical
fallacy of a shape-shifting populism in an attempt to erase the distinction between left
and right. In the present historical context, as self-avowed rightwing nationalists run
amok across much of the globe, reasserting the most savage inequalities, it seems like a
propitious moment to propose that we give this overworked fallacy a rest. 
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ABSTRACTS
This paper explores the viability of populism as both a historical category and a political concept.
Its  starting point is  the historical  example of  the first  mass political  expression that formed
under the name of  populism, and that  was the U.S.  People's  Party of  the 1890s.  Although it
carried the nickname of the Populist Party, this had virtually none of the meanings that were
attached to the term populism at a later date. Historical populism in the U.S. was a farmer-labor
movement that corresponded to labor and social-democratic movements across the late 19th -
century capitalist world. This poses the challenge: is populism a capacious enough concept to
include the U.S. historical precedent? Or does including the U.S. precedent render the category
and concept toothless or even useless?
Cet article explore la viabilité du populisme en tant que catégorie historique et concept politique.
Son point de départ est l’exemple historique de la première expression politique de masse qui
s’est formée sous le nom de populisme, c’était le Parti du Peuple aux Etats-Unis dans les années
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1890. Bien qu’il porte le surnom de Parti Populiste, il n’a pratiquement aucune des significations
qui ont été attachées au terme populisme à une date ultérieure. Le populisme historique aux
États-Unis était un mouvement paysan-ouvrier qui correspondait aux mouvements ouvriers et
sociaux-démocrates du monde capitaliste de la fin du XIXe siècle. Cela pose le problème suivant :
le  populisme  est-il  un  concept  suffisamment  expansif  pour  inclure  le  précédent  historique
américain  ?  Ou  bien  l’inclusion  du  précédent  américain  rend-elle  la  catégorie  et  le  concept
impuissants, voire inutiles ?
Este artículo explora la viabilidad del populismo como una categoría histórica y un concepto
político. Su punto de partida es el ejemplo histórico de la primera expresión política de masa que
se formó bajo el nombre de populismo, y que fue el Partido del Pueblo de los Estados Unidos de la
década de 1890. Aunque llevaba el sobrenombre del Partido Populista,  esto prácticamente no
tenía  ninguno  de  los  significados  que  se  le  atribuyeron  al  término  populismo  en  una  fecha
posterior.  El  populismo  histórico  en  los  EE.  UU.  fue  un  movimiento  campesino-laboral  que
correspondió a movimientos laborales y socialdemócratas en todo el mundo capitalista de fines
del siglo XIX. Esto plantea el desafío: ¿es el populismo un concepto con capacidad suficiente para
incluir el precedente histórico de los Estados Unidos? ¿O incluir el precedente de EE. UU. hace
que la categoría y el concepto sean ineficaces o incluso inútiles?
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